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NOTES

Changing the Approach to Ending
Child Labor: An International
Solution to an International Problem
ABSTRACT

A recent study by the United States Departmentof Labor
has revealed that oppressive child labor is a serious problem
in many countries. This Note begins by examining the
internationalscope of the child labor problem, including the
underlying reasonsfor its continued existence. The Note then
discusses measures, both unilateral and multilateral, for
curtailing child labor. The author determines that these
measures are insufficient to end the child laborproblem and
discusses potential solutions to the problem. The author
concludes that the most effective measure to end child labor
would be a multilateral agreement with clear standards and
an enforcement mechanism. However, because such a
measure is not yet in force, the author believes that child
labor will likely continue in the internationalcommunity for
the foreseeablefuture.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Over fifty years ago, the United States Congress successfully
legislated against child labor by passing the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938,1 an act that the Supreme Court upheld in the case of
United States v. Darby.2 These actions freed U.S. children from
working unconscionable hours in unhealthy environments for
negligible pay. As a result, ten-year-old girls were no longer
forced to slave away for fifteen-hour days in U.S. textile factories,

1.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter the Act].
Congress declared that "[n]o employer shall employ any oppressive child labor in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce .... " Id. § 212(c). The Act
defines "oppressive child labor" as employment of a person under 16 years of age
in any occupation, as well as employment of persons ages 16 to 18 in hazardous
occupations. Id. § 203(1).
2.
312 U.S. 100 (1941). The Court held that "Congress ... is free to
exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are
destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare...."
Id. at 114. The Court specifically overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918), which had held that Congress possessed no power to regulate child labor.
Darby,312 U.S. at 115-17.
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the exits nailed shut to prevent escape.' For over4 fifty years, such
conditions have not existed in the United States.
The same cannot be said for other countries. For example,
thirteen-year-old Praiwan in Bangkok makes leather handbags
from eight o'clock in the morning until eleven o'clock at night,
with only hour-long breaks for lunch and dinner s After waiting
in line for a shower, he finally goes to bed at one o'clock in the
morning.6 He is given only two days off each month and earns a
mere twenty-four dollars per month for his labor. 7 Thirteen-yearold Lesly in Honduras works up to eighty hours a week making
sweaters. 8
For her thirty-eight cents per hour she suffers
through beatings, choking dust, locked bathrooms, unreachable
9
quotas, and factory managers who "like to touch the girls."
The countries in which these factories operate, where
children suffer abuses each day, are either unable or unwilling to
stop the abuses. In fact, the factory where Praiwan and two
hundred other children work won the industry's "Best Exporter
Award" four years in a row,1 0 despite Thailand's child labor laws
that limit children aged thirteen to fifteen to light work."
Something more needs to be done to end the abuse of child labor
worldwide.
For the purposes of this Note, the term "child labor" does not
refer to all of the activities in which children engage that could be

3.

Numerous accounts of such child labor abuses in the United States in

the early twentieth century are related in EDWIN MARKHAM ET AL., CHILDREN IN
BONDAGE (1914).
4.
This is not to say that child labor no longer exists in the United States.
A recent U.S. Department of Labor investigation of Food Lion stores revealed
almost 1,400 child labor violations, most of which involved teenagers working on

dangerous machinery and minors working excessive or late-night hours. Food
Lion Will Pay Record $16.2 Million: Child Labor, Overtime Case Is Settled, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1993, at 43.

See also Dole v. Fountain, 120 Lab. Cas. (CCH)

35,582 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 12, 1990) (finding child labor law violations where the
president of a children's home engaged those children in unpaid construction

work under threat of punishment). For a less serious example, see He's Out of
There, BOSTON GLOBE, May 25, 1993, at 57, reporting that the Georgia Labor
Department ordered the Savannah Cardinals minor league baseball team to fire
its 14-year-old batboy, because that employment violated child labor laws.

5.

Lynn Kamm, How Our Greed Keeps Kids Trapped in Foreign

Sweatshops, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1993, at C5.

6.

Id.

Id.
7.
8.
Mitchell Zuckoff, Free Trade, Human Rights Clash Over GATT, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 30, 1994, at 77.

9.

Id.

10.

Kamm, supra note 5.

11.

U.S. DEP'r OF STAIE, HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS & SENA'E COMM.

ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1993, at 748 (Joint Comm. Print 1994) [hereinafter COUNTRY

REPORTS].
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classified as work. This Note limits the discussion to child labor
in industry, the area fraught with the most potential dangers to a
child's health.'2 Areas of labor such as working on a family farm
and the performing arts receive no consideration. 13 Likewise, this
Note does not concern itself with the distressing number of young
children involved in prostitution. 14 Child labor in industry is the
type that can most easily be influenced by outside forces and,
therefore, is the focus of this Note.
Part II of this Note provides a brief overview of the child labor
problem, including both the reasons for its continued existence
and the justifications for its curtailment by the international
community, especially the United States. Part III examines the
unilateral and multilateral measures that are currently in use, as
well as those that are being proposed, to combat oppressive child
labor and concludes with a discussion of why these measures fail
to solve the child labor problem. Finally, Part IV considers
measures that likely would be more effective than those currently
in use, and proposes one possible solution for implementation of
such measures.
II. THE

CHILD LABOR PROBLEM

A. The Alarming Statistics

In late 1994, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
estimated that there were 200 million child laborers in the world's

12.
Some common examples of these dangers include poor lighting, which
leads to near-blindness; poor ventilation, which leads to oxygen deficiency; toxic
fumes, which lead to asthma or bronchitis; hernias; deformation of bone
structure; bums; broken bones; and lost limbs. U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
INr'L LABOR AFFAIRS, BY THE SWEAT AND TOIL OF CHILDREN: THE USE OF CHILD LABOR
IN AMERICAN IMPORTS 37, 52, 54 (1994) [hereinafter SWEATAND TOIL].

13.
Most of this sort of labor is "light work," and most countries set a lower
minimum age at which people may engage in such work. RONALD G. EHRENBERG,
LABOR MARKETS AND INTEGRATING NATIONAL ECONOMIES 48 (1994).

Additionally,

agricultural work done on a family farm is rarely reported, since it is most often
the parents who report child labor abuses.
14.
Some estimates put the number of children working in Asia's sex trade
at one million. Charles P. Wallace, Widening the War on Child Sex, L.A. TIMES,
July 13, 1994, at Al. In Thailand, children make up 25% to 40% of all
prostitutes. William Branigin, Childrenfor Sale in Thailand:Poverty, Greed Force
Girls into Prostitution,WASH. POSr, Dec. 28, 1993, at Al. Although the statistics
are alarming, prostitution is almost always an exclusively domestic problem.
Thus, there is no way for one country to take measures to end child prostitution
in another country.
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Over ninety-five percent of these. workers live in

developing countries. 16 In Africa, approximately one out of three
17
children work; in Latin America, the ratio drops to one in five.
These statistics contrast sharply with earlier studies. In 1986,
the ILO estimated that there were only eighty-eight million child
workers.18 This dangerous increase in the amount of child
labor' 9 illustrates the ineffectiveness of current measures to
curtail child labor.
B. The Reasons for Child Labor
Poverty is the reason most frequently offered as a cause of
child labor. 20 This approach posits that the dismal economic
conditions in some countries force children to work to help
support their families. 2 1 More broadly, some writers argue that

15.
Anna Quindlen, ChildLabor is World Trade's Dirty Little Secret, DETROr
FREE PRESS, Nov. 25, 1994, at A19. The United Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund (UNICEF) arrived at the same estimate. Paul Haven, Subteen
Coal Miners of Colombia Laboring in Terrible Conditions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1995,
at A2.
16.
SWEATAND TOIL, supra note 12, at 2.
17.
Id. In fact, children make up 17% of Africa's total work force. Sale of
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography: Report Submitted by Mr. Vitit
Muntarbhorn,Special Rapporteur,U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 50th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 22, at 20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/84 (1994).

18.

Joseph Albright & Marcia Kunstel, Child Labor: The Profits of Shame,

WASH. POST, July 12, 1987, at C1. Going back even further, the 1979 estimates
found only 56 million child workers. Id.
19.
By way of comparison, the annual number of births in developing
countries between 1983 and 1992 increased by only approximately 15%.
CompareJAMES P. GRANT, UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD's CHILDREN, 1986, at
132-33 (1986) (listing basic demographic statistics for various countries for the
year 1983) with JAMES P. GRANr, UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD's CHILDREN
1994, at 64-65 (1994) (listing basic demographic statistics for various countries
for the year 1992). Thus, the over 100% increase in child labor cannot simply be
attributed to a greater number of children in the world.
20.
In fact, it was the poverty in Dublin during the early eighteenth
century that led one satirist to propose an offbeat use for children: food for the
wealthy. JONATHAN SWIFT, A Modest Proposal, in JONATHAN SWFI.
A CRICAL
EDITION OF THE MAJOR WORKS 492 (Angus Ross & David Woolley eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 1984) (1729). Swift's rationalizations, with a few minor adjustments, could
just as easily come from those abusing child labor today:
I desire those... who dislike my overture... [to] first ask the parents of
these mortals, whether they would not at this day think it a great
happiness to have been sold for food at a year old, in the manner I
prescribe; and thereby have avoided such a perpetual scene of
misfortunes as they have since gone through ....

Id. at 498.
21.
Int'l Labour Office, Report of the Director-General, Child Labour, INT'L
LAB. CONF., 69th Sess., at 11 (1983).
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child labor is necessary for a developing country to survive in the
global market.2 2 Proponents of this view argue that developed
countries such as the United States have, at some time in the
past, made use of child labor. 23 Because developing countries
cannot keep pace with more developed countries in areas such as
technology, employing cheap labor-including that performed by
children-is the only way those countries can remain competitive.
Thus, these countries must use such labor until they can
compete equally on the global market.
However, some studies have questioned whether children's
contributions to family incomes are truly significant.
For
example, a study by the United Nations International Children's
Emergency Fund (UNICEF) determined that, in Latin America, the
proportion of household income earned by children rarely exceeds
ten to twenty percent. 2 4 Other experts agree that, in a country
such as India, while a child's income does add a stable amount to
25 It
household income, it is nonetheless only a small amount.
appears that child labor does little to alleviate the poverty that
proponents often cite as an excuse for the labor.
Arguably, child labor contributes to poverty, rather than
ameliorating it. By working, children neglect their education,
26
damage their health, and restrict their future earning capacity.

Consequently, children may grow up without the skills necessary
for more advanced, higher-paying jobs. More broadly, because
child labor promotes a future work force devoid of educated
personnel, it leads to an endless cycle of lower-paying jobs and
continued poverty. The fact that there would be more jobs
available for adults if children were removed from
the workplace
27
further weakens this justification for child labor.

22.
See, e.g., Stephen Chapman, How Americans Can Stop Child Labor
Abroad, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1994, at C3.
23.
Id. Such proponents seem to ignore the fact that some of the world's
most successful nations, such as South Korea, have never used child labor.
Zuckoff, supranote 8 (statement by Senator Tom Harkin).
24.
V. COLBERT DE ARBOLEDA EX AL., CHILD LABOR AND BASIC EDUCATION IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: A PROPOSED UNICEF INITIATIVE 3 (1994), cited in
SWEATAND TOIL, supranote 12, at 22 n.44.
25.
MYRON WEINER, THE CHILD AND THE STATE IN INDIA 50 (1991) (statement
of economist Nasir Tyabji).
26.
International Child Labor Study Hearings Before the Bureau of Intl
Labor Affairs of the U.S. Dep't of Labor, § B-8, at 4 (1994) [hereinafter Child Labor
Hearings] (statement of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions).
See generallyWEINER, supra note 25.
27.
Naturally, employers argue that adults would not want these jobs,
since conditions are poor and wages are low. This ignores the fact that, if
children were not available as an exploitable option, employers would have to
improve conditions and raise wages to entice adult workers. Therefore, the jobs

would be attractive to adults.
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Another reason for the persistence of child labor is the
economic self-interest of employers.
Employers can take
advantage of children more easily than they can adults. Experts
agree that child workers are "less demanding, more obedient, and
less likely to object to their treatment or conditions of work." 28 A
child work force, accordingly, means greater profits for the
employers. For example, in the Portuguese garment industry,
29
employers pay children about ten percent of an adult's wage.
Stories of abuses in India's carpet industry further illustrate the

exploitation of children for economic gain.

For example, when

children suffered cuts from working on the looms, employers
would scrape sulfur from match heads into the wounds and then
set the sulfur on fire to stop the bleedinge-thereby returning the
children to work sooner.
In the Egyptian textile industry,
seventy-three percent of children work over twelve hours per day
for wages of approximately eight dollars a month. 3 1 Employers
are unlikely to relinquish access to such cheap, exploitable labor
unless someone threatens them with effective penalties.
The real or imagined lack of alternatives for children also
contributes to the problem of child labor. In societies with
insufficient educational opportunities, a child's daytime activities
may be limited to begging, stealing, or working.3 2 Of these three
activities, most children and their parents view working as the
most acceptable choice, for this option provides at least some
hope for the future.33 In the absence of compulsory, affordable
education, working may be the only way for these children to stay
off the streets.
Finally, many societies view child labor as a way of life. Such
societies believe that a child will develop a skill by working at a
young age, and that this skill will lead to learning a trade that will
support the child throughout life. 3 4 In Africa, people look upon
child labor as a form of education that initiates the child into a
path of communal life and work, a path that African society

28.
SWEATAND TOIL, supranote 12, at 3.
29.
Interview with Jose Fernando Teixeira Silva, Member of the National
Board, Textile Federation (May 18, 1994), cited in SWEAT AND TOIL, supra note 12,
at 144 n. 10.
30.
Stephan Wagstyl, The Child Victims of India's Slave Trade, FINANCIAL

TIMES, Dec. 19, 1992, at I.

31.
ADEL AZER Er AL., TRAINING AND WELFARE OF WORKING CHILDREN IN
SHUBRA EL KHEIMA 74 (1993), cited in SWEATAND TOIL, supra note 12, at 64 n. 10.
32.
Unfortunately, those societies lacking educational opportunities
appear to be in the majority. See discussion infra Section IV.D.
33.
Parents hope that their working children will learn a trade that will
serve as a career when they reach adulthood. However, this is rarely the case.
See infra note 39.
34.
SWEATAND TOIL, supra note 12, at 24.

1210

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 28:1203

values highly. 35
Many Asian societies believe that "children
should work to develop a sense of responsibility and develop a
.s6
career, rather than become street urchins and beggars ...
Likewise, Pakistani parents push their children into work at a
young age to avoid vagrancy. 3 7 Throughout India, children's
participation in work is entirely consistent with the indigenous
cultural tradition, because work has always been an important
socializing device. 38 Regardless of whether or not these beliefs are
sound, 3 9 they remain prevalent among certain societies.

C. Justificationsfor United States Intervention to CurtailChild
LaborAbroad
Before the United States or any other country can take
measures to combat child labor outside its borders, it must have
a justification for its actions. 4° How the rest of the world reacts to
the attempted intervention depends largely upon the grounds that
support the country's actions.
The justifications for acting
outside one's borders in response to the child labor problem may
be classified as economic 4 ' or humanitarian. 42

35.
Michel Bonnet, Child Labour in Africa, 132 INT'L LAB. REV. 371, 377
(1993).
36.
SWEATAND TOIL, supra note 12, at 24.
37.
Child Labor Hearings, supra note 26, § B-16 (statement of Omar
Noman, Senior Research Economist, Oxford University).
38.
See Leela Dube, The Economic Roles of Children in India: Methodological
Issues, in CHILD WORK, POVERTY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 179 (Gerry Rodgers &
Guy Standing eds., 1981).
39.
Most experts agree that these beliefs are unfounded. Rather than
preparing a child for a future trade, most jobs for children require only unskilled
labor. Assefa Bequele & Jo Boyden, Child Labour: Problems, Policies and
Programmes, in COMBATING CHILD LABOR 1, 6 (Assefa Bequele & Jo Boyden eds.,
1988).
40.
Note that a justification only explains a country's actions; it does not
necessarily make those actions valid. The United Nations Charter states that
members should refrain from the "threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state .... " U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4). The
Charter does not define the term "force," and that term may be broad enough to
encompass economic measures. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 892 (3d ed. 1993). See also Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to
Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1989) (discussing the meaning of Article
2(4)).
41.
See, e.g., Stephen M. DeLuca, Comment, The Gulf Crisis and Collective
Security Under the United Nations Charter,3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 267, 275-76 (1991)
(mentioning economic interests as one alleged justification for Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait). Although the United Nations has stated that economic considerations do
not justify acts of aggression, Definition ofAggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR,
29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), it defines
aggression as the use of armed force against the sovereignty of another state. Id.
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Current United States measures aimed at ending child labor
have a primarily economic thrust. 4 3
Most United States
legislation cites the elimination of unfair competition as a
justification for ending child labor in foreign countries that export
to the United States. 4 4 If companies that employ cheap child

labor can undercut the costs of production of U.S. companies,
then the products produced in those countries will enter the
United States market priced lower than those manufactured in
the United States. Thus, U.S. companies are at a competitive
disadvantage if other countries allow the use of child labor.
However, an economic justification for intervention does not
allow for correction of the underlying problem. To alleviate the
competitive disadvantage, the United States need only impose a
tariff on the incoming products.
Although such a measure
effectively ends the unfair competition problem, the greater
problem of child labor remains. Countries need only pay higher
tariffs, not terminate the practice of child labor within their
borders. If the United States desires an end to child labor
practices, it must base its actions on a different justification.
Humanitarian justifications have greater appeal to the
average citizen of a developed country like the United States. 45 A
common example of a humanitarian justification is the claim that
child labor robs children of a normal childhood.4 s Most United
States citizens have a particularly idealized view of childhood, and
a child toiling in a sweatshop for twelve hours a day does not
correspond with that view. Additionally, the abuse that occurs

art. 1. It is doubtful that such a definition is broad enough to encompass
economic sanctions.
42.
See, e.g., Nancy D. Arnison, International Law and Non-Intervention:
When Do HumanitarianConcerns Supersede Sovereignty?, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 199 (1993); Joan Fitzpatrick, Flight From Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary
"Refuge" and Local Responses to Forced Migrations, 35 VA. J. INTL L. 13, 34-35
(1994).

See generally ENFORCING RESrRART1r

COLLECTIE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL

CONFLICTS (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1993) (discussing the tensions between state
sovereignty and the growing influence of humanitarian grounds for international

action).
43.

Although there is rhetoric about the humanitarian justification in the

debates on passage of the measures, see 139 CONG. REC. S3179 (daily ed. Mar.
18, 1993) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin), even a cursory reading of the measures
reveals that they do nothing to end the underlying causes of child labor, an

important element of humanitarian justifications.
44.
See infra text accompanying notes 91-95 and 122.
45.
Additionally, human rights groups such as Amnesty International take
this approach. But, because they lack the resources of a government such as the
United States, they have little impact on the problem. All that these groups can
do is hope to sway governments away from the economic justification.
46.
Of course, this ignores the fact that what constitutes a "normal"
childhood is a cultural variable.
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along with some forms of child labor 47 offends popularly-held
perceptions of human rights in general, and the young age of the
abused only worsens the effect.
Measures enacted in furtherance of a humanitarian
justification are more likely to attack the heart of the problem.
While an economic justification will end only the importing of
products made by child labor, a humanitarian justification will
make great strides toward eliminating child labor itself by

improving education and alleviating poverty. Such an approach
removes the underlying reasons for resort to child labor, a much
more effective way to end the problem. However, because most
current measures are of the economic variety, oppressive child
labor will likely persist.

III. MEASURES CURRENTLY IN USE TO CURTAIL CHILD LABOR

A. Is There Customary InternationalLaw that ProhibitsChild
Labor?
Before looking at present measures, it may be helpful to
address whether restrictions on the use of child labor are part of
the universal body of public international law. Most nations have
enacted domestic legislation against child labor, 48 however, that
legislation is enforceable only by the country that enacts it, not by
outside parties. Each nation is sovereign over its territory, 49 and
interference from other countries flies in the face of national
sovereignty. 5 0 Thus, third parties must rely on more than just
domestic legislation to combat child labor in foreign countries.
There are three primary sources of international law: treaties,
general principles, and custom. 5 1 Of these, treaties may be the
strongest because they are written, binding agreements between
nations. A significant drawback to treaties, however, is that a
particular treaty binds only those nations party to it. 5 2 Without

47.

See supratext accompanying notes 5-9, 30.

48.

See infra Section III.C.

49.
50.

MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (3d ed. 1991).
Id. at 276-77.

51.
Some scholars argue that a fourth source, called general international
law, now exists. Jonathan I. Charney, UniversalInternationalLaw, 87 Am. J. INT'L
L. 529, 546 (1993). This source is similar to customary international law, but has
no requirement of state practice. Put simply, the law may arise from a "strongly
endorsed declaration at a near-universal diplomatic forum." Id.
52.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].

Additionally,

"[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its
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custom for support,53 treaties are a poor source of international
Thus, treaties incorporate
law among outside parties. s 4

restrictions on child labor into the international law between

certain nations,55 but not all nations that make use of child labor
are parties to the treaties.
General principles are a rarely used source of international
law, as many of the leading scholars debate whether such
principles can ipso facto be international law.5 6 In theory, these
principles form a common thread through the domestic laws of
individual states;5 7 they reveal that the states are in agreement
in legislating against a particular wrong. According to Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), the
general principle must be common to all the principal legal
systems of the world.5 8 Courts have rarely drawn on general
principles as an autonomous and distinct source of international
law.5 9 Nevertheless, they are an unqualified primary source
under the I.C.J. Statute.6 0 Thus, because all the principal legal
systems have domestic legislation against child labor, 6 1 the

consent.'

Id. art. 34. A "third State" is one that is not party to the treaty. Id. art.

2(I)(h).
53.
"Nothing . . . precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming
binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as
such." Id. art. 38:
54.
Generally, these treaties can create customary law only "when such
agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely
accepted." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(3) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. But see ANTHONY D'AMATO,
INTERNA71ONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 123-47 (1987) (arguing that treaties
alone can generate custom).
55.
Section III(D) of this Note discusses treaties that contain provisions
against child labor and will provide a more in-depth discussion.

56.

OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACICE 50

(1991).
57.
Some general principles that writers have cited in the past include res
judicata, estoppel, and the rule that people may not judge their own causes. IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (4th ed. 1990).
58.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(I)(c), 59 Stat.
1055, 1060 (1945) [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute]. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note
54, § 102 note 1.
SCHACHTER supranote 56, at 51. See also Right of Passage over Indian
59.
Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12). However, these principles are
useful as temporary gap-fillers in international law, and even more useful as a
means for extending international law into new areas of international concern.
SCHACTER, supra note 56, at 51.
60.
Notice that in the I.C.J. Statute, judicial decisions and scholarly
writings are "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." I.C.J.
Statute, supra note 58, art. 38(1)(d). No such designation modifies the reference
to general principles of law.
61.
National legal provisions on the minimum age for admission to
employment, 10(1) CONDITIONS OF WORK DIG. 103, 147-76 (1991) [hereinafter
National legalprovisions] (listing countries and their domestic child labor laws).
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common thread of a general principle exists in the area of child

labor.

62
The final potential source of international law is custom.
Simply put, customary international law is a mode of doing
business that the international community considers a legal
obligation.
Showing the existence of a rule of customary
international law requires two elements: state practice that
reflects the rule (the generality requirement)6 and state belief

that following the rule is legally required (the opinio juris
requirement).6 Because fulfilling the generality requirement does
not require practice by all states, 65 the first element is not
difficult for a sympathetic court to establish.6 6 However, the
second element is more troublesome, mainly because it is difficult
67
to establish why a state engages in a particular practice.
Simply demonstrating that a state follows a rule does not prove
that the state believes it is subject to a legal obligation. 6 8 The
easiest way to prove the opinio juris is through statements by
states recognizing that they are legally bound by the rule.6 9 Since
such statements are rare, courts generally infer the second

62.

Some scholars predict that the distinction between customary law and

general principles will eventually become blurred. E.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN
RIGHTSAND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 89 (1989).
63.
Courts can find practice in various types of activities. The U.S.
Supreme Court has looked to treaties, government orders to military officers,

orders from military officers, and decisions of national courts as examples of state
practice. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686-700 (1900). The Permanent Court
of International Justice has looked to the writings of publicists, conventions, and
domestic court decisions as examples of practice. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 26-30 (Sept 7).
64.
BROWNLIE, supra note 57, at 7-11; North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G.
v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, 45 (Feb. 20) [hereinafter North Sea
Continental Shell].
65.
Courts have held that practice by less than a dozen states can
establish customary international law. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 687-95,
708; S.S. Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 22-28 (Aug. 17). But see
North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 44-46 (finding that no customary rule
of law existed, since most states did not acquiesce in the custom).
66.
Proof of state practice varies on a case-by-case basis. For example,
there is flexibility in what constitutes practice, how long such practice must
continue, and the required generality of state participation.
See Hiram E.
Chodosh, Neither Treaty nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International
Law, 26 TEX. INT%. L.J. 87, 100-05 (1991).
67.
MERON, supra note 62, at 53. The International Court of Justice rarely
examines whether states realize that they may be creating new law. Martti
Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 4, 27 (1990);
MERON, supranote 62, at 108.
68.
For example, a country may follow a rule in order not to offend another
country with which it is involved in delicate negotiations.
69.
HENKIN ETAL., supranote 40, at 81.
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element "from the constancy and uniformity of state conduct." 70
With such an amorphous standard, whether anything shoit of an
affirmative statement recognizing the legal obligation establishes
opinio juris is unpredictable at best, and is basically left to the
court's judgment.
No court has yet considered whether a prohibition of child
labor is a customary norm of international law. Most likely, no
such norm exists. While there is certainly practice to support the
norm, there remains a staggering amount of practice inconsistent
Furthermore, it is difficult to argue that
with that norm.
conforming practice is due to a sense of legal obligation. Consider
the failed attempts by the United States to insert child labor
prohibitions into the new General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
71
(GATT) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
These attempts were met with such resistance by less-developed
countries that it is difficult to see how these countries would ever
consider themselves bound by a rule of customary international
law against child labor.
Nevertheless, a sympathetic court could find support to
establish a customary norm. First, practice is in accordance with
such a rule.72 All countries place some sort of restrictions on the
use of child labor, usually regulating inherently dangerous
activities.7 3 Even though countries do not always follow these
74
restrictions, violations do not dilute the general practice.

Second, the state practice has resulted in the development of a

70.

HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATONAL LAW 450-52 (Robert W.

Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966). Kelsen further states, "But to the extent that it is so
inferred it is this conduct and not the particular state of mind accompanying
conduct that is decisive." Id. Thus, these courts are missing the point as to what

exactly constitutes opiniojuris.
See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
71.
72.
The quantity of evidence required may be quite low, as rights that
protect "universally accepted values of humanity, and whose violation triggers
broad condemnation by the international community, will require a lesser amount
of confirmatory evidence." MERON, supra note 62, at 94.

See infra text accompanying note 134.
73.
"The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as
74.
customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity
[]nstances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule
with the rule....
should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule...." Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 (June 27). For example,

all countries also have prohibitions on the use of official torture. Even so, human
rights organizations put forth statistics to show that some of these countries do
engage in official torture. AMNSTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON TORTURE 109-217
(1973). Nevertheless, a prohibition on official torture remains a customary norm
of international law. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1980).
Simply because violations occur does not nullify the norm's validity. See Anthony
D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1110, 1126 (1982).
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sense of legal obligation among nations.75 When an outside party
claims that child labor occurs in a country, that country's
government either denies the allegation 7 6 or states that it is
working to correct the abuse. 77 No government claims that it is
free to use child labor however it wants. Therefore, one might
argue that nations have acceded to the legal obligation brought on
by custom.
Even if a court could find a customary norm forbidding
inherently dangerous child labor, 78 its lack of specificity could
lead to inconsistent application of the norm and, therefore, render
the norm itself of little value. For example, no universal definition
of a child exists; in some nations, childhood ends at age thirteen,
79
while in others it continues through the age of fifteen.
Additionally, there is the problem of deciding exactly what
conditions must be present to constitute inherently dangerous
labor.8 0 A court could overlook this lack of specificity in the clear

75.
In discussing the role of international courts in determining customary
norms that regard human rights issues, Theodor Meron states that the tendency
is for the courts to ignore state practice and simply "assume that humanitarian
principles deserving recognition as the positive law of the international
community have in fact been recognized as such by states." MERON, supra note
62, at 41-42.
76.
See, e.g., Michael Browning, Chinese Leaders Angrily Deny that
Children Make the Toys, DEMOIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 29, 1991, at Ag. An example
from a Nepalese official exemplifies these denials: "Since child labor is illegal, it
cannot exist." John-Thor Dahlburg, Trading with Tiny Hands,L.A. TIMES, July 12,
1994, at Hi, H4.
77.
Somini Sengupta, India's Young Workers; Poverty Makes Child Labor a
Way ofLjfe, NEWSDAY, Feb. 9, 1995, at A35.
78.
Indeed, such a norm might rise to the level of an erga omnes
obligation, an obligation owed to all states. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 54, §
702 cmt. o (stating that obligations of customary international law involving
human rights are erga omnes obligations). See also MERON, supra note 62, at
153.
ILO Convention No. 138 Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to
79.
Employment, June 26, 1973 [hereinafter ILO Convention 138), in INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR ORGANISATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
1919-1981, at 730 (1982) [hereinafter CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS]
attempts to set such a minimum age for admission to employment. See infra
notes 159-64 and accompanying text. However, that Convention is not part of the
opinio juris and is enforceable only against countries that have signed the
Convention. No minimum age exists by way of customary international law.
Although many countries set the minimum age for employment when compulsory
education ends, it is not enough of a "common thread" to make it a general
principle of international law.
80.
For example, the ILO defines hazardous work as involving "dangerous
lifting of heavy weights and underground
substances, agents or processes ....
work." ILO Recommendation No. 146 Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to
10, June 26, 1973, in CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
Employment, art. I,
supra note 79, at 736. The Recommendation goes on to suggest that the
definition be revised periodically in light of advancing scientific and technological
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cases that involve ten-year-old boys working twelve hours a day in
mines infested with toxic fumes. However, in a close case, a court
would experience more difficulty in deciding whether the
customary norm has been violated.
The tremendous benefits to be gained from having a
customary norm restricting child labor s ' outweigh the difficulty in
precisely defining that norm. Although it would require that a
court stretch the requirements for customary international law,
concerned countries should make an attempt to establish such a
norm. A customary norm prohibiting child labor would carry
significant weight in the fight against oppressive child labor in the
international community.
B. UnilateralMeasures: United States

1. Generalized Trade Legislation
Because U.S. laws do not specifically target foreign child
labor, the United States must rely on its generalized trade
legislation to combat the child labor problem.
Existing U.S.
legislation allows for only a small degree of regulation in the realm
of child labor. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),82 the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA),8 3 and the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)84 condition U.S.
participation in trade with developing countries upon those
countries' guarantees of internationally recognized workers'
rights.8 5
Additionally, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA)8 6 promotes the flow of capital to developing
87
countries, provided that those countries adopt certain policies,
including the guarantee of internationally recognized workers'
rights.8 8 These rights include a minimum age requirement for the

knowledge. Id. Even less specific is the definition used by some countries that
describes hazardous work as "dangerous, dirty, unhealthy, or detrimental to
morals." Victoria Sinclair & Gabriele Trah, Child labour:Nationallegislation on the
minimum agefor admissionto employment or work, 10(1) CONDITIONS OF WORK DIG.
18, 25 (1991).

81.

See infra text accompanying notes 187-93.

82.
19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
83.
19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
84.
22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
85.
This provision is found in GSP in 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7), CBERA in 19
U.S.C. § 2702 (b)(7), and OPIC in 22 U.S.C. § 2191(a).
86.
22 U.S.C. § 290k (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
87.
FAYE LYLE, BUREAU OF INTML LABOR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, WORKER
RIGHTS INU.S. POLICY 11 (1991).

88.

22 U.S.C. § 290k-2.
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employment of children. 89
The requirement is only that
participating nations establish a minimum age; the law, however,
90
does not recommend a specific minimum age.
After the above conditions have been met and trade has
begun, the Trade Act of 1974 (Trade Act)9 1 allows for retaliation
for violations. Section 301 of the Trade Act9 authorizes the
United States Trade Representative to retaliate against foreign
states that violate United States trade rights.93 One of Section
301's provisions gives the trade representative discretion as to
whether or not to take action against countries that deny workers'
rights. 9 4 Such denial constitutes an unfair trade practice because
it gives those countries a competitive advantage over the United
States, which does recognize such rights. 95
A number of problems impede the use of these measures to
combat child labor. Most seriously, developing countries could
potentially unite and attempt to create new international worker
rights.
For example, if mandatory health care were an

internationally recognized workers' right, the United States would

be in violation of that requirement.

Foreign countries could

refuse to trade with the United States until it implemented a plan
for mandatory health care for workers. 9 6 If these countries
believed that the United States was pushing its values upon their
sovereignty by imposing restrictions on child labor, they could

89.
19 U.S.C. § 2462 (a)(4)(D).
90.
This is a common problem with generalized trade legislation.
91.
19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2465 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
92.
19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as amended by the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) [hereinafter Section 301].
The most noticeable change the amending act made was the removal of retaliatory
power from the President and the transfer of it instead to the U.S. Trade
Representative.
93.
Id. Section 301 allows the United States to threaten trade retaliation
against countries to eliminate unfair trade practices, with the definition of"unfair"
left to the unilateral determination of the United States See generally AGGRESSIVE
UNIATERALISM: AMERICA's 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYS'FEM
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990).
94.
Section 301, supranote 92, §§ 241 1(b)(1), (d)(3)(B)(iii). Those workers'
rights are found in 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(4) and are the same rights guaranteed by
the GSP, CBERA, OPIC, and MIGA.
95.
See Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of InternationalLabour Standards
on the World Trading Regime, 126 INTL LAB. REV. 565, 567 (1987).
96.
This is not so far-fetched as it might seem. The United States is the
only developed country that does not have some kind of universal health care
coverage for its citizens. See Christine Cassel, The Right to Health Care, the Social
Contrac, and Health Reform in the United States, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53, 56
(1994); Janet L. Shikles & Lawrence H. Thompson, Strategies to Reduce Health
CareSpending and Increase Coverage,3 STAN. L. & POL' REV. 103, 103 (1991).
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retaliate by imposing their own values. Thus, using existing
legislation to combat child labor may be unwise.
2. The Child Labor Deterrence Acts (1989-1993)
Recently, in addition to the generalized trade legislation,
Congress has considered a more specific measure. Prior to the
bill's revamping in 1995, Senator Tom Harkin introduced the last
incarnation of the Child Labor Deterrence Act (CLDA)9 7 on March
18, 1993. 9 8 The bill required the Secretary of Labor to identify
99
foreign countries whose industries make use of child labor,
which is defined as labor performed by an individual under the
The Secretary of Labor was to make this
age of fifteen.10°
determination by reviewing information from all sources,
including the ILO and other human rights organizations. l 01 The
names of the violating countries and industries were to be
published in the Federal Register, along with facts to support the
findings.102 At that point, the Secretary of Labor would have
placed a prohibition on the importation of any product from that
foreign industry. 33 Any importer violating this ban would have
been subject to a civil penalty of up to $25,0000° 4 and a criminal
penalty consisting of $10,000 to $35,000, a year in prison, or
both.1o5
The 1993 bill was substantially the same as previous versions
of the CLDA. 0 6 All of these bills shared a major flaw: they
GAIT provided that "no
violated GATT' ° 7 as it then stood.
prohibitions or restrictions . . . whether made effective through
quotas, import or export licenses, or other measures, shall be
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the

97.

S. 613, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter CLDA].

98.

139 CONG. REC. S3179 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1993).

99.

CLDA, supranote 97, § 4(a).

100.
Id. § 8(2).
101.
Id. § 4(a).
102.
Id. § 4(e)(1).
103.
Id. § 5(a)(1).
Id. § 6(b).
104.
105.
Id. § 6(c).
106.
These previous incarnations include the Child Labor Deterrence Act of
1991, H.R. 3786, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), the International Child Labor
Deterrence Act of 1990, S. 2698, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), and the Child
Labor Deterrence Act of 1989, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). S. 613's companion
bill in the House, H.R. 1397, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), has only one
difference: the ban applies only to articles produced by an industry that "does not
comply with the applicable national laws prohibiting child labor in the workplace."
Id. § 4(a)(1).
107.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
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importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party. .
"
The CLDA placed an absolute
prohibition on products made by child labor and was therefore
not within the GATT principles. 109
A conflict with GATT principles does not, however, sound the
death-knell for any legislation. Indeed, an inconsistent federal
law enacted after GATT takes precedence over that agreement. 1 10
The United States has a history of enacting GATT-inconsistent
measures.1 1 1 Thus, the United States could have gone forward
with legislation such as the CLDA. However, the United States
would have opened itself up to retaliation by its trading
partners. 1 12 This realization did not escape Senator Harkin, as
the 1993 version of the CLDA, like its predecessors, died before
enactment. Senator Harkin let the proposal die after experts
1 13
determined that the bill would indeed conflict with GATT.
3. The Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1995114
On April 6, 1995, Senator Harkin introduced a new version of
the Child Labor Deterrence Act (1995 CLDA). 1 15 The 1995 version
retains the framework of the earlier bills while making significant
changes in its approach to the problem of child labor. The most
striking of these changes is the recognition of the underlying
conditions giving rise to child labor. The 1995 CLDA recognizes
that child labor is rooted in societal problems such as poverty,
poor education, and low standards of living. 1 16 Thus, in addition
to the trade restrictions found in the earlier versions, the 1995
CLDA takes steps to end these underlying conditions.

108.
109.

Id. art. XI.
For a detailed analysis of the 1993 CLDA, see James P. Kelleher, Note,

The Child Labor DeterrenceAct: American Unilateralismand the GATT, 3 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 161, 168-88 (1994). For a detailed analysis of the 1991 CLDA, see
Michael A. Tonya, Note, Baby Steps Toward International Fair Labor Standards:
Evaluatingthe Child LaborDeterrenceAct, 24 CASEW. RES. J. INr'L L. 631, 655-66
(1992).
110.
See RESTATEMENr, supranote 54, § 115 (1987).
111.
See generally Robert E. Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of GATT
Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989,2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1993).
112.
Lately, such retaliation has become more likely.
See William C.
Duncan, Trade Brinkmanship: A War that Could Wreak Economic Havoc, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 21, 1994, § 5, at 21 (arguing that using Section 301 to impose trade
sanctions against Japan, in blatant violation of the GATT agreement, would bring
a harsh response from Japan).
113.
Mitchell Zuckoff, "Rugmark" Certifies No Child Labor Was Used, CIII.
TRIB., Feb. 4, 1995, § 6, at 16.
114.
S. 706, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter 1995 CLDA].
115.
141 CONG. REC. S5404 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1995).
116.
1995 CLDA, supranote 114, § 2(a)(7).
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First, the 1995 CLDA supports programs that supply child
1 7
workers with a primary education and alternative skills. '
Additionally, the bill offers aid to foreign countries to help them
better enforce their own child labor laws.' 1 8 It also increases aid
to alleviate the widespread poverty that is one of the primary
causes of child labor." 9 To do this, the 1995 CLDA authorizes
the President of the United States to contribute ten million dollars
to the ILO each year from 1996 to 2000.120 It further authorizes
the President to give $100,000 to the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights in the year 1996.121
The absence in the 1995 CLDA of one of the justifications
used by previous bills furthers the shift in the legislative
approach to the child labor problem. Prior versions of the CLDA
found, as a justification for measures against child labor, that
"[a]dult workers in the United States should not have their jobs
imperiled by imports produced by child labor in developing

countries." 12 2 The absence of this language in the 1995 CLDA
may signal a move away from economic justifications.
The 1995 CLDA also includes a loophole for countries that
123
the Secretary of Labor has determined violate child labor laws.
Importers in the United States may still receive a product from
such a country provided that the product contains a label stating
that it was not made by child labor. 124 To obtain such a label,
the country must allow an independent organization 125 to inspect
the product and certify that no child labor was used in its
The 1995 CLDA also includes a different
manufacture. 126
definition of the term "child." Although the normal age is still
fifteen years, 12 7 the bill reduces it to fourteen years in those
28
countries where the national laws so define a child.1
While the 1995 CLDA improves upon previous versions, it
retains the same trade restrictions as its predecessors and,

117.

d. § 2(b)(2).

118.

I

119.

Id.

§ 2(c)(4).

120.
121.

I& § 9(1).

122.

CLDA, supra note 97, § 2(a)(9).

Ic § 9(2).

123. This is the same determination made under the previous versions of
the CLDA. See supranotes 99-103 and accompanying text.
124. 1995 CLDA, supra note 114, § 5(b)(2)(A)(i).
125. These organizations would be established to inspect products for
export and certify that they were not made by child labor. The organizations
would be made up of representatives of nongovernmental child welfare
organizations, manufacturers, exporters, and neutral international organizations.

I& § 5(b)(4).
126. Id. § 5(a)(2)(A).
127. Id. § 8(2)(A).

128.

I& § 8(2)(B).
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therefore, shares the same fatal flaw as its predecessors: it is
GATT-inconsistent. The 1995 CLDA must contend with the
strengthened version of the GATT that resulted from the Uruguay
Round negotiations.1 29 Since the new GAIT incorporates the
older version,' 3 0 the 1995 CLDA must still deal with the language
13 1
outlawing prohibitions and restrictions on imported goods.
Thus, the 1995 CLDA will likely die the same death as the 1993
CLDA. 13 2 Overall, it is safer for the United States to avoid trade
measures in the fight against oppressive child labor and instead
concentrate on other means to end the problem.
C. UnilateralMeasures: Other Countries' DomesticLegislation
Child labor is most prevalent in Third World developing
countries.'3 Nearly all of the Third World countries from which
the United States imports products have some sort of child labor
laws. l 34 Most of these countries have a minimum age for
employment of between fourteen and sixteen years. However,
many countries severely dilute the effectiveness of such laws by
granting exceptions. For example, in Guatemala, a child may be
granted a work permit if "extreme poverty" makes it essential that
the child work to support the family. 13 5
In Brazil, judges
frequently grant exceptions to the minimum age laws for
apprenticeships, even though apprenticeship status suffers from
a lack of regulation.1 3 6 In Bangladesh, the twenty-five laws and
ordinances that protect children "present a confusing maze of

129. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Part I, 33 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter Uruguay Round
Act]. The United States adopted the Uruguay Round agreements in the Uruguay
Round Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
130. Uruguay Round Act, supra note 129, Annex 1A,
1(a).
131.
See supranote 108 and accompanying text.
132. In fact, a recent analysis found that the 1995 CLDA has only a 26%
chance of being passed by the Senate and only a 21% chance of surviving the
House. Billcast for S. 706, Information for Public Affairs, Inc., available in
Westlaw, Billcast (BC) database (searched on June 26, 1995).
133.
Supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.

134. The only exception to this appears to be Zimbabwe. However, an
agreement by Zimbabwe's National Employment Council, which has the force of
law, places the minimum age for mining activities at seventeen. Interview with
Doug Verden, Labor Relations Manager, Chamber of Mines (June 13, 1994), cited
in SWEATAND TOIL, supranote 12, at 165.
135. Codigo de Trabajo [Labor Code], Decree 1441, art. 11 (1961) (Guat.),
translated in GENERAL SECRETARIAT, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, A
STATEMENT OF THE LAWS OF GUATEMALA IN MATIERS AFFECTING BUSINESS 113, 122
(1975). Indonesian laws contain a similar exception.
note 11, at 652.
136.
SWEATANDTOIL, supra note 12, at 40.

COUNTM REPORTS, supra
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conflicting provisions regarding child labor," placing the 3minimum
7
age for employment at anywhere from twelve to sixteen.1
In addition to granting exceptions, most countries are unable
to enforce their labor laws effectively. Countries most frequently
blame the problem on a lack of resources and personnel in the
agencies responsible for policing child labor.'13 However, this is
not the only reason for ineffective enforcement. For example, in
China, underage children frequently use counterfeit identification
cards to circumvent the laws. 13 9 In Guatemala, labor courts are

backlogged and understaffed, with defendants frequently free to

choose the judge before whom they appear. 140 Often, the lack of
effectiveness is due to "[s]heer callousness, almost bordering on
sadism, on the part of enforcement officials.... .141
Child labor laws in developing countries have had little or no
effect. These countries are either unable or, in some cases,
unwilling to enforce their laws. This is likely due to the problems
this Note discusses earlier. 142 Societal acceptance of child labor
leads to little reporting of child labor violations. Employers'
economic interests in perpetuating child labor frequently lead to
the bribing of public officials to ignore the violations. Finally, a
developing country's desire to compete in the global marketplace
encourages further acceptance of child labor in that country.
For the developed countries that have no serious child labor
problems, the sparse attempts at ending child labor abroad are
generally confined to trade measures like those employed by the
United States.'4 Those measures have the same weaknesses as
U.S. measures: they conflict with GATT and do not focus on the
Therefore, developed
underlying causes of child labor. 144
countries should look to other means for ending child labor.
D. MultilateralMeasures
As this Note states above, treaties are the best multilateral
measure for curtailing child labor abuses. 14 5 While a general

137.
138.
139.
140.

I& at 32.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 71.

141.
PHARIS HARVEY & LAUREN RIGGIN, TRADING AWAY THE FUrIURE: CHILD
LABOR IN INDIA's EXPORT INDUSIRIES 18 (1994) (quoting NAT'L LABOR INSr., WORKING
CHILDREN IN INDIA 3 (1993)).

142.
143.

See supra Section II.B.
These are the sorts of measures that the Brussels-based International

Confederation of Free Trade Unions has proposed. Dahlburg, supranote 76.
144.
Naturally, a conflict with GATT is relevant only if that country is a

party to the GATT agreement.
145. See supratext accompanying notes 51-55.
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customary norm against child labor may exist, this norm lacks
the specificity that a treaty can provide. While the customary
norm is unclear as to exactly what ages are involved, treaties can
clearly set a minimum age. Additionally, a treaty can provide for
a clear enforcement mechanism that administers definite
penalties for violations of treaty provisions. Because of these and
other benefits, a multilateral treaty is one of the best devices for
eliminating child labor. 146
Several treaties currently attempt to curtail child labor
abuses. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (U.N.
Convention),1 47 unanimously adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly on November 20, 1989,148 attempts to protect children
on several different fronts. Article 32 of that document deals with

child labor and requires states to implement "legislative,

administrative, social and educational measures 14 9 to protect
children's "physical, mental, spiritual, moral [and] social
development."1 5 0 In particular, the U.N. Convention requires
states to establish a minimum age for admission to
employment, 15 1 regulate the hours and conditions of
employment, 15 2 and provide penalties and sanctions to enforce
these provisions. 13
The greatest weakness of the U.N. Convention is the lack of
an enforcement mechanism. 1 4 Article 45 comes the closest to
146. An added benefit of such treaties is that they help to define and create
customary international law. See North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.;
F.R.G. v. Neth.) 169 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb. 20) (discussing treaty provisions that may
pass "into the general corpus of international law and [that may be] accepted as
such by the opino jutris, so as to have become binding even for countries which
Thus, treaty
have never and do not, become parties" to the agreement).
provisions can, over time, become international law. See generally SCHACHTER,
supranote 56, at 66-72.
147.
Nov. 20, 1989, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 44th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item
108, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1456 (1989) [hereinafter
U.N. Convention].
148. Adoption of a Convention on the Rights of the Child: Report of the Third
Committee, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N.
Doc. A/44/49 (1989).
149. U.N. Convention, supranote 147, art. 32(2).

150.

Id. art. 32(1).

151.

Id. art. 32(2)(a). Again, the U.N. Convention recommends no specific

minimum age, which allows states a wide range of discretion in meeting the

requirements. The CLDA is the only measure that sets a specific minimum age.
152.
153.
154.

Id. art. 32(2)(b).
Id. art. 32(2)(c).
Child labor conventions are not the only international agreements that

commonly lack enforcement agreements. For example, international intellectual
property agreements also contain few enforcement mechanisms. Anne D. Waters,
Note, Trade, Intellectual Property, and the Development of Central and Eastern
Europe: Filling the GAYT Gap, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 927, 948 (1993).
Nevertheless, the lack of an enforcement mechanism is a serious weakness. In
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providing for enforcement, by requiring agencies that monitor the
child
labor problem to
report their
suggestions and

recommendations to the U.N. General Assembly. 15 5 This article
would be triggered when a monitoring agency finds that a state is
not fulfilling its Article 32 obligations. Article 32 of the U.N.
Convention, which is the provision aimed specifically at child
labor, directs that the states themselves shall enforce the labor
laws passed under the provision. 156 Considering these states'
poor history of child labor law enforcement,1 57 there likely would
be little change. Once Article 45 has been invoked, the General
Assembly must decide on a course of action. 15s
Aside from the U.N. Convention, there are other multilateral
measures in effect. The ILO has produced several conventions
dealing with child labor. ILO Convention No. 138 Concerning
Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (ILO Convention
138)159 requires each party to specify a minimum age for
employment. This minimum age must not be less than the age of
completion of compulsory schooling, with an absolute minimum
age of fifteen years. 160 ILO Convention 138 allows for an initial
16 1
minimum age of fourteen years if the country can show a need,
but the country must eventually raise the minimum age to at
least fifteen years. In addition, ILO Convention 138 sets a
minimum age of eighteen years for employment that endangers a
young person's health, safety, or morals. 162 ILO Convention 138
allows exceptions to the minimum age requirements, but only for

short, it is like passing a series of criminal statutes and then neglecting to hire a
police force. In the absence of enforcement mechanisms, parties must rely on the
maxim pacta sunt servanda ("agreements are to be observed ") to ensure that
states follow the treaty. See TASLIM 0. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 40-45

(1974) (discussing the concept ofpacta sunt servanda and its application to treaty

observance).
155. U.N. Convention, supra note 147, art. 45(d).
156. Specifically, the provision states that parties to the Convention shall
"[p]rovide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the effective
enforcement of the present article." Id. art. 32(2)(c).
157. See supratext accompanying notes 138-41.
158. The General Assembly may then make recommendations to either the
United Nations members or the Security Council. U.N. CHARTER art. 10. When
the Security Council decides on the appropriate measures, it may require the
member states to apply those measures. Id. art. 41. Most likely, such measures
would be limited to the interruptions of economic relations provided for in Article

41, rather than the more forceful measures of Article 42 used to "maintain or
restore international peace and security.' Id. art. 42.
159. ILO Convention 138, supra note 79.
160. Id. art. 2(3).
161. Id art. 2(4). This exception is available only for "a Member whose
economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed" and only "after
consultation with the organisations of employers and workers concerned." Id.

162.

Id art. 3(l).
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activities such as artistic performances 16 3 and work that would
neither jeopardize the children's health nor interfere with school
1
attendance. "
ILO Convention 138 contains an escape provision in Article 5,
which allows countries with insufficiently developed economies
16 5
and administrative facilities initially to limit its scope.
Countries doing so must specify to which industries they will
apply the full scope of the Convention. 16 6 This requirement
implies that those countries are expected to progressively widen
the scope as their economies and facilities develop. 167
Other multilateral agreements involving child labor include
the 1941 ILO Convention No. 59 Fixing the Minimum Age for
Admission of Children to Industrial Employment (ILO Convention
59)168 and its predecessor, the 1921 ILO Convention No. 5 Fixing
the Minimum Age for Admission of Children to Industrial
Employment (ILO Convention 5).169 Although ILO Convention
138 incorporates the provisions of these earlier agreements, they
remain important for several reasons. First, many countries that
are party to one or both of these agreements have not signed ILO
Convention 138.170
Second, the older agreements reveal the
subsequent increase in the suggested minimum age for
employment.
ILO Convention 5 sets a minimum age of
fourteen, 17 1 while ILO Convention 59, passed twenty years later,
sets a minimum age of fifteen. 172 Third, like ILO Convention 138,
neither of the earlier conventions contains provisions for its
enforcement, which reveals the primary weakness of multilateral
agreements over the last seventy-five years.

163.
164.

Id. art. 8(1).
Id. art. 7(1)(a) & (b).

165.

Id. art. 5(1).

166. Id. art. 5(2).
167. For example, art. 5(4) requires that countries periodically report
progress made toward full application of the provisions.
168. June 3, 1937 [hereinafter ILO Convention 59], in CONVENTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supranote 79, at 720.
169. Oct. 29, 1919 [hereinafter ILO Convention 5], in CONVENTIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, supranote 79, at 713.
170. These countries include India, Colombia, Pakistan, and China, among

others.
171. ILO Convention 5, supranote 169, art. 2.
172. ILO Convention 59, supra note 168, art. 2 (1). Notice that Convention
No. 138, passed 32 years later, retains the same minimum age. ILO Convention
138, supranote 79, art. 2(3).

199s]

ENDING CILD LABOR

1227

E. FactorsOverlooked By PresentMeasures
Existing United States measures ignore several realities of
child labor. First, the industrial sector is not the only field that
exploits child labor. Children often work as domestic servants, as
street vendors, in restaurants, and in other jobs that do not
export products to foreign countries.1 7 3 The CLDA and similar,
trade-related measures deal only with the importing of products
and would, therefore, have no impact on child labor in the
nonexport fields. This demonstrates a weakness with measures
justified by purely economic concerns: child labor that does not
hurt United States competitiveness goes undeterred.
A second major flaw with existing U.S. measures is that, in
dealing with products that are shipped to foreign markets, they
concentrate on the finished product, rather than on the individual
parts. Thus, an industry can employ child labor to construct
parts and then ship the parts elsewhere for assembly by labor
that does not violate the agreements. For example, reports
indicate that the leather tanning industries in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America, which likely employ child labor, frequently ship
leather to other countries where it is made without child labor
into such things as shoes and handbags that are then exported to
the United States.'1 4 In addition, child labor is frequently utilized
in the manufacture of carpets.' 7 s Since Germany is a major
center for worldwide distribution of carpets, it is possible that
many of those carpets were first imported from countries where
child labor was used.17 6 Current United State trade measures
would not affect the importation of these carpets.

A third flaw in existing U.S. legislation is that it only attempts
to stop child labor used in goods that are exported to the United
States. Many countries and industries that use child labor may
do little exporting to the United States, but may export a
considerable quantity of goods to other nations. Conversely,
those industries may do little exporting at all, yet still use child
labor in producing the sort of goods that United States trade
measures would penalize if exported. Existing legislation does
nothing to curtail such instances of child labor. For example,
there is little U.S. trade with African countries in products that
child labor could produce.' 7 7 And yet, the ILO estimates that
some twenty-five percent of children work on the African

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

SWEATANDTOIL, supranote 12, at 2.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 2.
I& at 16.
Id.at 6.
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continent, with some countries having rates as high as fifty
percent.178

The United States trade measures leave tremendous room for
continued child labor abuse. The U.N. Convention solves this
problem by requiring an end to child labor in general, whether or
not exported products are involved. 17 9 However, the lack of an
effective enforcement mechanism considerably dilutes the U.N.
Convention.' 8 " Additionally, the U.N. Convention leaves to the
states the choice of a minimum employment age, 1 8 ' thereby
allowing the cultural values of the individual societies to
perpetuate the regimes. The drafters of the U.N. Convention seem
to be unaware that what is needed is not new child labor laws,
but rather a means to enforce the ones that are already in place.
Neither the existing unilateral nor the existing multilateral
measures is sufficient to end the child labor problem. Therefore,
instead of relying on these measures, countries concerned with
the problem of child labor need to develop new solutions. These
solutions should use elements of the existing measures that do
work in combination with new ideas that strike at the underlying
causes of child labor. The next section of this Note discusses the
elements necessary for an effective solution to the child labor
problem.
IV. POTENTIAL MEASURES NOT YET TAKEN
There are two schools of thought in devising potential
strategies for ending child labor: those who want the immediate
abolishment of child labor, and those who want a slower phasingout of child labor. 1 82 The former claim that such a strategy would
benefit developing countries both economically and socially, and
they recommend a policy of strict enforcement of both compulsory
education and minimum age laws.' 8 3 Such a policy would be
easier to administer and less open to corruption than a policy of
regulation.

178.

Id.

179. U.N. Convention, supranote 147, art. 32.
180.
See supranotes 154-58.
181. U.N. Convention, supranote 147, art. 32(2)(a). It should be noted that
this is also one of the strengths of the Convention. By requiring individual states
to set their own minimum age, the Convention allows for each state's different
cultural and societal values relating to children to influence the effect of the
Convention. Unfortunately, many of those values need to be changed if child
labor is ever to be eradicated, and the Convention may leave too much room in

this regard.
182. SWEATAND TOIL, supranote 12, at 5.
183. Id.
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Those favoring the phase-out approach advocate a regulatory
policy. This group, probably the majority, realizes that the
immediate abolition of child labor is unrealistic. They propose to

abolish the most abusive forms of child labor and to allow

individual governments to regulate the other forms. 18 4 This group
argues that child labor cannot be abolished until the underlying
causes of the problem no longer exist. Thus, the phase-out
advocates believe that child labor should be allowed to continue,
but only in a strictly regulated form.
In comparing the two strategies, the phase-out approach is
clearly the most workable. Although countries should ideally
eradicate child labor immediately, this goal is unrealistic.
Measures adopted to end child labor should concentrate on the
most abusive forms of child labor, such as slavery, bonded labor,
and mining, and then move on to the less dangerous forms.
Countries can abolish these at a later date, once the early
measures successfully deal with the underlying causes. The most
effective solution likely will take this approach.
It is also important to establish the existence of a customary
international norm prohibiting child labor. For those countries
not party to any treaty involving child labor practices, a
customary norm is the only means by which restrictions may be
applied against them. For example, countries such as Iran, Iraq,
and Syria have not become parties to any treaties regarding child
labor.1 8 5 In the absence of a customary international norm, child
labor within those countries is a purely domestic matter. Other
countries can take no action without violating the national
1 86
sovereignty of the state.
However, if there is a customary norm against child labor,
then it becomes international law. In this way, even countries
that are not party to child labor treaties are bound by the law. A
violation 1 8 7 of this law then allows the international community to

184.
185.

Id.
There is little information available on the incidents of child labor in

these countries. However, based on the products exported by these countries
and the way such products are made in other countries, it is a safe assumption
that they use child labor in making the products. For example, Iran has a 35%
share of the Persian carpet market, compared to India's 14.5% share. Nora
Boustany, Foreign Journal;In Iran, "A Poor Man's Carpet is the Ground, and His
Blanket is the Sky," WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1994, at A17.
186. See supranotes 49-50 and accompanying text.

187. Even though child labor violations are usually committed by a private,
nongovernmental actor, the international community may still take action against
the state. The state is responsible because it did not make diligent efforts to
prevent the violation or punish the violator on its own. MERON, supra note 62, at
171. Thus, the state violates its international obligations by allowing the
violations to occur. Id. at 170.
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take various countermeasures.1 8 8
The most effective
countermeasure would be some type of collective sanction, taken
by aggrieved states through joint or parallel action. 18 9 Common
collective sanctions include trade boycotts and the severance of
diplomatic relations. 190 Although such actions may in some
cases violate a treaty or other obligation owed to the state, they
19 1
may nonetheless be justified as a reprisal by the injured states.
The violating state may try to argue that measures by other
states constitute intervention in "matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." 192 However, the
United Nations has rejected this argument, concluding that
human rights violations are not a domestic matter. 19 3 Therefore,
a customary norm allows for the abolishment of child labor in all
countries, not just those party to a treaty.
A. GovernmentalMeasures: United States

The United States took an important first step in eradicating
child labor by approving the new GATT treaty. Although human
rights groups lost the battle to make recognition of certain
workers' rights a condition for trade under the agreement, 194 the
United States is now in a much better position *to secure such
restrictions through side agreements. This situation is similar to
that involving the passage of NAFTA. 195 There, opponents also
were unable to include recognition of workers' rights in the

188. Id. at 153. Countermeasures are an important tool in combatting
human rights violations; states rely on them more often than judicial remedies.
Id. at 233-34.
189. HENKINETAL., supranote 40, at 581.

190.

Id

191. Id. The states engaging in the sanction need not have suffered an
actual injury. If the violation affects a collective interest of the international
community (certainly the case when dealing with a customary norm of
international law involving human rights), states may take action against the
offender for its violation of the erga omnes obligation. Id. See also MERON, supra
note 62, at 235 (indicating that all states, not just those directly affected, may
take countermeasures against states violating erga omnes obligations).
192. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
193. See Louis Henlin, InternationalLaw: Politics, Values and Function, 216
RECUEIL DES COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 266 (1989).
194. Third world developing countries such as India led the fight against
these restrictions, arguing that the measures were protectionist and an attempt to
hinder these countries from competing in the global market. Zuckoff, supra note
8. They also argued that such measures were punitive when the child might be
the only wage earner in a family. Quindlen, supranote 15.
195. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).

1995]

ENDING CHILD LABOR

1231

agreement. 19 6 However, subsequent to NAFTA's passage, the
Clinton Administration was able to negotiate side agreements
guaranteeing Mexico's adherence to those rights, including a
limitation on child labor. 197 Likewise, the United States can now
negotiate similar side agreements to the GATT. Had the United
States not signed the treaty, it would have "never [had] an
opportunity to ban child labor on an international basis."198
Thus, the United States should make it a priority to negotiate
these side agreements. The United States may undertake such
negotiations through the World Trade Organization (WTO) 19 9 that
GATT created. 200
The WTO provides a forum for further
discussions relating to trade and also provides for strengthened
dispute settlement procedures. 20 ' Thus, much as it did in the
case of NAFTA, the United States should continue its push for the
recognition of workers' rights, including those of children, in this
new forum.
Another possible avenue for reform would be to increase
trade sanctions through stronger child labor legislation. For
example, rather than just disallowing a country's imports made
by child labor, more effective legislation would disallow all of an
abusing country's imports. Before resorting to such extreme
measures, however, the United States must be sure that it can
deal with the consequences.
Trade sanctions are a blatant
violation of GATT.
Although the United States has violated
2
previous versions of that agreement with few repercussions, 0
the new GATT presents greater problems. Under the previous
GATT treaties, imposing a penalty on a violator required the
unanimous consent of all parties.2 0 3 However, the latest GATT
2 °4
requires unanimous consent to not impose a penalty.

196.

John Dillin, CampaignOver NAFTA Comes Down to the Wire, CHRISIAN

SC. MONrIOR, Nov. 16, 1993, at 1.
197.

EHRENBERG, supranote 13, at 94.

198.

Zuckoff, supra note 8 (statement by John Boidock, Executive Director

of the Alliance for GATT Now).

199.

Id.

200. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994
[hereinafter WTO], in Uruguay Round Act, supranote 129, Part I.
201.
WTO, supra note 200, art. Ill. See also Karel van Wolferen, Will the
New World Trade Organization Work? No Chance-East and West Trade Won't
Meet, WASH. Posr, June 26, 1994, at C3 (suggesting that the WTO will be unable
to perform its prescribed function, as it presupposes a commonality of purpose
that does not exist).
202.
Robert A. Senser, Danger! Children at Work, COMMONWEAL, Aug. 19,
1994, at 12.
203. Zuckoff, supra note 8. Obviously, under such a regime, the United
States could simply vote against imposing a sanction on itself.
204.
Id.
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This change results from a modification in the decisionmaking process involving trade disputes. Under the old GATT,

the parties reached decisions by consensus. 20 5

In this way,

2 °6
members adopted a decision only when no member objected.
This practice developed despite the requirement that all decisions
be made by majority vote. 2 ° 7 Under this framework, the United
States could block a sanction against itself simply by objecting to
its adoption. The new GATT reverses this pattern. According to
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (USD),20 8 dispute resolution is a threestage2 °9 process: consultation, 2 10 a panel phase,2 1 1 and appellate
If consultation among the disputing parties 2 is
review.21 2
13
unsuccessful, a panel may be established to decide the matter.
When a panel renders its decision, that decision, if not appealed,
is 2 adopted
unless members decide by consensus not to adopt
it. 14 This "reverse consensus" system virtually guarantees the
adoption of panel decisions. 2 15 Therefore, under the new system,
the United States can no longer block the adoption of a decision
imposing a sanction against it.
The enactment of extreme child labor legislation would
potentially subject the United States to various sanctions from its
trading partners. Under the new GATT, these sanctions range
from the painless to the potentially debilitating. The offending
country may be required to compensate the injured state. 2 16 If
the parties cannot agree on compensation, the injured party may
request retaliation.2 17 This permits the injured party to suspend
its obligations toward the violator in regard to the same sector

205. Gardner Patterson & Eliza Patterson, The Road from GATT to MTO, 3
MINN. J. GLOBALTRADE 35, 37 (1994).
206. OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND lTS LIMITATIONS INTHE GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE

SYSTEM 55 (1987).
207. GATT, supranote 107, art. XXV, para. 2.
208. Dec. 15, 1993 [hereinafter USD], in Uruguay Round Act, supra note
129, Part II, Annex 2.
209. A fourth stage, binding arbitration, is optional. USD, supranote 208,
art. 25.
210. Id. art. 4.
211. Id. art. 12.
212. Id. art. 17.
213. Id. art. 4(7).
214. Id. art. 16(4). The decision of the appellate body is adopted in the
same way. Id. art. 17(14).
215. Results of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1994) (statement of John H.
Jackson, professor of law at the University of Michigan Law School).
216. USD, supra note 208, art. 22(2).
217. Id.
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and agreement. 21 8 Finally, the injured state may request crossretaliation.
This permits the injured state to suspend its
obligations toward the violator in regard to sectors 2and
19
agreements other than those affected by the violator's actions.
The United States could try to impose trade restrictions and
claim that they do not violate the GATT treaty. For example, the
protection of an erga omnes 2 20 right may take precedence over the
GATT provisions. 22 1 This requires that the protection of children
from the dangers of child labor be classified as an erga omnes
right. Because these rights derive from the "rules concerning the
basic rights of the human person,"2 22 the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child almost certainly classifies the protection of
children as an erga omnes obligation. A country signing on to the
Convention accepts such an obligation. For those countries,
then, this erga omnes obligation may override the GATT
provisions.
The United States may also sidestep retaliation under GATT
by classifying the imposed sanctions as a general exception under
GATT Article XX. 2 23 In the case of child labor, the statistics
would show that the production of goods via child labor is
harmful to human health.2 2 4 The difficulty here is the word
"necessary" in Article XX(b).
GATT Dispute Panels have

218.
Id. art. 22(3)(a), (b). The USD defines the different sectors as goods,
services, and trade-related intellectual property rights. Id. art. 22(3)(f).
219.
Id. art. 22(3)(c). If an injured party resorts to this option, the violator
has the opportunity to refer the matter to an arbitrator to ensure that such
retaliation is justified. Id. art. 22(6).
220.
Erga omnes rights are those rights that have such importance that all
states have a legal interest in their protection. Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, Limited (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5) [hereinafter
Barcelona Traction].
221.
The European Community has stated that "the [GATT] Panel could not
ignore that the General Agreement was an international agreement which had to
be interpreted on the basis of generally accepted principles and practices of
international law." GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report: EEC-Quantitative
Restrictions Against Imports of Certain Products from Hong Kong, GATT Doc.

L/5511

(July 12, 1983), in GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS,

30th Supp. 129, 134 (1984).
222.
Barcelona Traction, 1970 I.C.J. at 32. See also RESTATEMENT, supra
note 54, § 702 cmt. o.
223. The relevant portion of that article provides that "nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures.. .necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life
or health....
GATT, supra note 107, art. XX. This exception is "[slubject to the
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade .... " Id. art. XX.
224. For a list of some potential harms, see supranote 12.
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interpreted this as meaning the least-GATT-inconsistent
alternative that a country could reasonably be expected to employ
to achieve its overriding public policy goals. 2 25
Further,
inconsistencies with GATT must be "unavoidable."2 2 6 This is a
difficult standard to meet, 2 27 and it is likely that a GATT Panel
would find that alternatives such as a product labelling
requirement 2 28 foreclose the availability of other trade sanctions.

The passage of the new GAIT places additional burdens on a
country attempting to claim exceptions.
The Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement)2 29 takes a stem view
of technical regulations, defined as those that mandate
compliance with "product characteristics or their related
processes and production methods .. ."230 Much like Article XX
of the older GATT, the TBT Agreement states that such
regulations may only be applied to fulfill a legitimate objective,
including the protection of human health and safety, and must
not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill that
23
objective. '
Further, it is difficult to impose those regulations on lessdeveloped countries, which is where most child labor occurs. A
country such as the United States must "take into account the
special development, financial and trade needs of developing
country Members . . ."232 and must ensure that its regulations
"do not create unnecessary obstacles to exports from developing

225.
GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report: Thailand-Restrictions on
Importation of and InternationalTaxes on Cigarettes, GAIT Doc. DS10/R (Nov. 7,
1990), in GATT, BASIC INSIRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 37th Supp. 200,
223 (1991).
226.
Id.
227.
For example, in the Dolphin I case, a GAIT panel found that

international cooperative arrangements were an available alternative to United

States trade restrictions.

GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report: United

States-Restrictionson Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DSS21/R (Feb. 18, 1992), in
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 39th Supp. 155, 199 (1993).
The Panel ignored the fact that the United States had unsuccessfully struggled to

reach such an arrangement for 15 years, and constantly had met with resistance
from other countries. If this is an "available" alternative, there may be little that
could be called "unavailable."
228. In fact, Indian carpet manufacturers have started the Association of
Carpet Manufacturers Without Child Labor to label members' carpets "child
labor-free." Lucy Komisar, Buy Products 'Made Without Child Labor," CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 26, 1993, at 19. Thus, this is almost assuredly an available
alternative.
229.

Dec. 13, 1993 [hereinafter TBT Agreement], in Uruguay Round Act,

supranote 129, Part I, Annex 1A-6.
230. TBT Agreement, supranote 229, Annex 1,
231.
232.

Id. art. 2, para. 2.2.
Id. art. 12, para. 12.2.

1.
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Further, a country may not impose the
country Members." 23
regulation immediately, as it must "allow time for producers in
exporting Members, and particularly in developing country
Members, to adapt their 2products or methods of production..
to the new requirements. 3
Overall, it is best to avoid unilateral trade measures. Too
often, other countries see these measures as attempts to interfere
with another nation's sovereignty. A far less hazardous-and
would be the negotiation of
potentially more productive-course
235
international agreements.
B. Governmental Measures: Other Countries'Domestic Legislation
Developed countries should follow the same strategies this
For developing
Note outlines above for the United States.

countries where child labor occurs,

the governments must

23 6
If laws do
strengthen their existing domestic child labor laws.
not yet prescribe a minimum age for employment, countries must
pass laws that set a minimum age. Further, the countries must
This means an end to the
effectively enforce these laws.
corruption that currently impedes the enforcement of child labor
In this respect, the U.N.
laws in developing countries. 23 7
Convention serves as a good starting point for the international
monitoring of states' enforcement of the laws.2 3 8 Additionally, the
international community must impose real penalties on those
If the
countries in which enforcement is substandard.
international community can rely on countries to enforce their
own child labor laws, the community is free to concentrate on
alleviating the underlying causes of child labor.

C. MultilateralGovernmental Measures
Any country that is truly concerned with the problem of child
labor should sign the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Although the document is far from perfect, it does represent a

233.

Id. art. 12, para. 12.3.

234. Id. art. 2, para.2.12.
235. See infra Section lV.C.
236. Although measures such as the CLDA may have some impact, "[o]nly
the strictest domestic legislation in each foreign country could overcome [the]
pressing needs and lack of alternative activities." Tonya, supra note 109, at 665.
As an example, some violators of India's law are released with only a
237.
two dollar fine. Stan Grossfeld, Trapped in a Hellhole, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29,

1994, at A8. The government must end the corruption on both sides, both the
enforcing officials who take bribes and the factory owners who offer them.
Perhaps outside supervision is the best way to achieve an end to the corruption.
238. U.N. Convention, supranote 147, art. 45.
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valuable initial effort.
At a minimum, signing the U.N.
Convention is a symbolic gesture that signifies a country's
dedication to ending child labor. Although over 140 countries
have signed the U.N. Convention, the United States is not among
them. 23 9 By not signing the Convention, unilateral measures of
2 40
the United States, such as the CLDA, appear hypocritical.
The U.N. Convention provides a party with substantial
certainty. As this Note discusses earlier, any norms of customary
international law restricting child labor are, at best, general in
scope, and lack the specificity necessary for effective enforcement.
The U.N. Convention provides both the specificity and the

potential to enforce it. By signing the U.N. Convention, a state
can hold another state accountable for its uses of child labor.
Thus, rather than simply banning the importation of certain
products, a concerned country can take real steps toward ending
the problem.
By signing the U.N. Convention, a country signifies its
intention to protect children's rights in general.
However,
countries must go further and create more specific agreements
dealing solely with child labor. 2 4 1 This allows greater attention to
the details necessary for an effective attack on child labor. Such
an agreement would resemble ILO Convention 138, but would
include an effective enforcement regime. 2 4 2
D. EducationalMeasures

Effective educational systems are the key to eliminating child
labor. Education. attacks the problem on a number of levels.
First, if countries keep children in school for longer periods, those
children cannot enter the work force at such a young age.
Second, the education that the children receive will assist them in
finding more rewarding employment in the future.
Third,
education provides an alternative to working, begging, or stealing.
Finally, education is the most effective way to break the cycle of

239. Maureen Moran, Comment, Ending Exploitative Child Labor Practices,5
PACE INTm'L L. REv. 287, 288-89 (1993). The reasons most commonly cited for the
failure of the United States to sign the treaty are the possible imposition of a
position on abortion and the possible usurpation of states' rights. Id. at 303-04.
240. In other words, the United States appears to want to force other

countries to abolish child labor, but is unwilling to subject itself to similar
standards.
241. The Convention on the Rights of the Child contains fifty-four articles,
only one of which is directed specifically at child labor. The other articles cover
everything from a child's freedom of expression (Article 13) to a child's rights in
criminal proceedings (Article 40).

242. As it now stands, ILO Convention No. 138 contains no provision
dealing with enforcement of the obligations imposed by the agreement.
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poverty that keeps underdeveloped countries in a disadvantaged
position.
In most countries with pervasive child labor, the educational
system has many problems. In some instances, the age when
compulsory education ends is lower than the age for admission to
When children in these countries finish their
employment.
For
are likely to seek illegal employment.
they
education,
the
through
only
Bangladesh
in
is
compulsory
education
example,
fifth grade, 2 43 while the minimum age for employment ranges
between twelve and sixteen. 24 4 In Lesotho, children must attend
school through age thirteen, 2 45 while fifteen is the minimum age
2 47
2
for employment. 46 The same is true in the Philippines.
Children who finish their compulsory education at such an early
age have little choice but to go to work soon thereafter.
In addition, many countries do not have enough schools to
accommodate all children. The fewer the schools, the more
common the inconvenience of travelling to a school far away. In
rural areas, schools are often located a long distance from the
children's homes, 248 making a daily trek to school a considerable
burden. Without a school closer to their homes, parents are likely
to prefer that their children work, rather than make the long
journey to a distant school.
Additionally, the number of school hours and days is
2 49
In Brazil,
extremely low in many developing countries.
time to
enough
have
still
and
school
attend
to
children are able
2 50
on a
operate
schools
public
Egypt,
In
shift.
work an eight-hour

shift schedule in which children go to classes in three sets for
four hours a day.2 5 This leaves too much free time for children,
free time that is too often filled with child labor.
The considerable cost for families to send their children to
school raises additional barriers to education. In Egypt, many
252
and, regardless of
families struggle to afford rising school costs
the expense, parents see little hope for a return from education in

COUNTRY REPORTS, supranote 11, at 1331.
243.
SWEATAND TOIL, supranote 12, at 32.
244.
Sinclair & Trah, supra note 80, at 40.
245.
Nationallegalprovisions, supra note 61, at 131.
246.
COUNIRY REPORTS, supra note 11, at 722. See also SWEAT AND TOIL,
247.
supra note 12, at 140.
SWEATAND TOIL, supranote 12, at 23.
248.
DEARBOLEDAETAL., supra note 24, at 23, cited in SWEATAND TOIL, supra
249.
note 12, at 24.
250. SWEATAND TOIL, supranote 12, at 24.
251. Id. at 66.
252. Carol Berger, After War, Egypt's Poor Get Poorer:Rising Unemployment
and Tough Austerity Measures Push Children into Economic FrontLine, CHRISTIAN
Sci. MONrTOR, Apr. 24, 1991, at 3.
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terms of preparing their children for future employment. 2 53 in
Latin America, a recent requirement that families pay a greater
portion of the costs for educating their children has deterred
enrollment of the poorer children. 2 54 In contrast, Sri Lanka, with
a nearly ninety percent literacy level, 2 55 provides free education
up to the university level and also pays for school supplies, meals,
and uniforms. 2 5 s For families that cannot afford to send their
children to school, child labor becomes a viable alternative.
As a study by the U.S. Department of Labor concluded, "No
country has successfully ended child labor without first making
education compulsory and enforcing these laws."25 7 Although
some countries such as Nepal do not mandate minimum levels of
education, 258 most countries do have compulsory education laws.
However, if these laws are to have any effect, countries must
enforce the laws more strictly. For example, in Brazil, although
the law requires education through the age of fourteen, 25 9 only
twenty-two percent of people complete primary school, one of the
lowest rates in the world. 26 0 India also requires education
through the age of fourteen, 26 1 but with one of the highest
illiteracy rates in the world and a very high dropout rate, 26 2 the
law obviously lacks enforcement.
The educational systems in developing countries must be
improved. Whether through constructing additional schools,

253. It is for this reason that UNICEF's Interministerial Committee on Child
Labor concluded that "[e]ducational policies have to provide children with
concrete benefits and develop their aptitudes in a way that is functional to them

and to their families." NATIONAL CENTER FOR SOCIAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH,
UNICEF, REPORT OF THE INTERMNSTERIAL COMMITFEE ON CHILD LABOUR INEGYPT 39
(1989). The Committee suggested that Egypt needs "an integrated plan to achieve
a balance between the output of the educational system and the needs of the
labour market." Id. at 40.
254. SWEATAND TOIL, supranote 12, at 23.
255. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 11, at 1397.
256. Michael M. Bums, Lessons from the Third World: Spirituality as the
Source of Commitment to Afflrmative Action, 14 VT. L. REV. 401, 410 (1990).
Despite the educational development in Sri Lanka, a recent study estimated that
there were as many as 500,000 child laborers in the country. Peter J. Spielmann,
Millions of Children in Asia Forced to Work in Sweatshops, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 21,
1995, at A13. Nevertheless, 75% of these children work in agriculture, which Sri
Lanka law does not prohibit ChildrenAre Placed on the Line: Toil in Near Slavery
on Subcontinent, DETROr FREE PRESS, July 27, 1995, at 5A.
257. SWEATANDTOIL, supra note 12, at 23.
258. Id at 124.
259. Sinclair & Trah, supra note 80, at 35.
260. JAMES P. GRANT, UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 1994, at
70 (1994).
261. INDIA CONST. art. 45.
262. David Housego, Neglect of Schools Could Hold Back Growth, FINANCIAL
TIMES, June 26, 1992, § 2, at 10.
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extending the school day, or raising the age for compulsory
education, developing countries must effect some sort of change.
Although only the country itself can change its educational laws,
both outside governmental and nongovernmental bodies can
assist in providing more schools for the children. This assistance
could take the form of loans or donations to the countries, or
volunteer efforts by human rights groups. Whatever the choice,
an improved educational system is a prerequisite to ending child
labor.
E. Nongovernmental Measures
Attempts to end child labor need not be confined to the
governmental sphere. Private citizens can certainly take their
Private actions also
own measures to stop the problem. 2 63
sidestep obligations under trade treaties. For example, consumer
boycotts of the offending products are not the actions of a state
and therefore do not violate any international agreement.
Concerned citizens need only seek out reports by organizations
such as the ILO to discover which countries and which products
use child labor. Such industries, faced with a falling demand for
their products, would either cease their use of child labor or be
forced out of business. On the down side, this could result in the
being thrown out into the streets to fend for
child laborers
2
themselves. 6
A far more ambitious undertaking would involve businesses
joining with the public to create new schools and day-care centers
for the former child laborers. The businesses could contribute the
funding, and the public could provide the labor. A joint privatepublic sector undertaking would improve businesses' public
relations.
All of these potential measures focus rather narrowly on
solving the problem of child labor. A truly effective solution must
expand the focus. The international community must work to

For
263. Unfortunately, such actions can sometimes be hazardous.
example, Iqbal Masih, a 12-year-old crusader against child labor in Pakistan, was
recently shot to death while riding his bicycle. Child Labor CrusaderHad World in
Hands Until Gunned Down, TENNESSEAN, Apr. 19, 1995, at A3. Members of the
carpet industry-notorious for child labor abuses-had made repeated threats
toward Masih for his actions, actions that had led to the closure of dozens of
carpet-weaving factories in the area. Id. Although the shooters have yet to be
found, Ehsan Ullah Khan, the chairman of the Bonded Labor Liberation Front,
believes that Masih's death was a "conspiracy by the carpet mafia." Id. However,
an independent human rights group found no evidence to support these claims.
Group:PakistanBusiness Interests Didn't Kill Boy, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 1995,

at 13.
264.

Kamm, supranote 5.
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eliminate the climate that creates the need for child labor in
developing countries. The two primary forces behind this climate
are poverty and societal acceptance of child labor. 2 65 Measures to

effect such a change are beyond the scope of this Note.
Nevertheless, work must be done in these areas if the steps taken
to eliminate child labor are to have a lasting effect.
F. The Ideal Solution

The most effective solution will combine the more successful
elements of current measures with the establishment of a
prohibition against child labor as customary international law.
2 66
Since most countries have signed the new GATT agreement,
the first move must be to negotiate a multilateral agreement
under the auspices of the WTO. The United States would likely
have the support of the European Community (EC) in these
negotiations, as the EC has pushed for protection of workers'
rights in previous trade negotiations. 2 6 7
Developing countries are likely to oppose attempts to link
trade to labor standards. They might fear that the developed
countries are simply trying to bar competition from countries
where labor is cheap. Thus, the negotiations must aim at
measures that do not weaken the competitive position of the
developing countries, yet still work to eradicate child labor. The
agreement must therefore adopt a phase-in approach, attacking
many different levels of the overall problem. With this in mind,
negotiators would be well-advised to structure the agreement
toward the eliminationof child labor rather than the prohibition of
child labor. Rather than simply declaring child labor to be illegal,
the ideal agreement must instead remove the need for child labor
in the first place.
As a first step, the most dangerous forms of child labor must
be abolished immediately. If countries refuse to do this, the
international community should apply multilateral trade
sanctions. If these fail, the U.N. Security Council should push for

more forceful action. At any rate, ILO Convention 138's allowance
for time limit extensions to particularly pressured countries

265.

Elizabeth B. Moore,

Child Labor and National Development: An

Annotated Bibliography, in CHILD DEVELOPMENt AND INTERNAMIONAL DEVELOPMENT:
RESEAI~c-POLICY INIERFACES 87, 90 (Daniel A. Wagner ed., 1983).

266. An updated list of parties to the GAIT is printed on the inside front
cover of the yearly periodical International Trade, published by the GATT
Secretariat.
267. U.S. Standing at the Center of Stormy Meeting on GAIT, CH. TRIB., Apr.
13, 1994, sec. Business, at 1.
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should play no part. 268 Once countries abolish these harsh forms

of child labor, they must legalize and strictly regulate the
remaining forms of child labor. The international community
should establish agencies to oversee the regulation, and if a
country becomes lax in its enforcement, the agencies should ask
the intemational community to consider multilateral sanctions.
In this way, developing countries will not lose the competitive
advantage provided by child labor, while the labor that continues
will be under safer conditions.
During these governmental negotiations, nongovernmental
actors must play a part in curtailing the demand for products
made by child labor. Consumers should boycott goods from those
countries

that

are

lax

in

enforcing

child

labor

laws. 2 69

Nongovernmental organizations can also play a role by
encouraging countries to sign child labor treaties. 27 0
Additionally, these groups can organize fundraising to pay for the
271
creation of educational facilities in impoverished countries.
These preliminary governmental and nongovernmental measures
should set the stage for future actions.
In the second step, the WTO-negotiated agreement should
implement multilateral measures that attempt to remove the
underlying causes of child labor. Most importantly, children
must be given alternatives to working. The best of these
alternatives is compulsory, affordable education.
Concemed

268.

That allowance is in Article 2(4).

The rationale for this allowance

simply does not apply in the area of dangerous forms of child labor. The
provision allows struggling countries to gradually implement the new limitations
so as to not cripple their economies. Further, it serves to allow some children to
continue working until more satisfactory educational facilities can be constructed.
If children are forced out of dangerous work environments, there are plenty of
adult workers capable of taking their place. Thus, the economy does not suffer.
269.
Some consumers and companies have already made a start in this
area.
Indian manufacturers may now place a label called the Rugmark,
consisting of a simple smiley-face symbol, on rugs made without child labor. The
rugmakers place the label on those products that UNICEF inspectors certify were
made without child labor. Zuckoff, supra note 113. In this way, consumers can
avoid rugs not bearing the mark and instead they can purchase those made by
law-abiding producers.
270.
For example, in February of 1995, UNICEF, the ILO, the Asian
American Free Labor Institute, and local charities began negotiations with
Bangladesh to end child labor in the production of clothes for export. Bangladesh
May End Some ChildLabor, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 17, 1995, at A14.
271.
Mohammed Alangier, the director of Focus, an advocacy group that
runs part-time schools and health clinics for child workers in Calcutta, has
suggested that the ILO establish loans to enable children to attend school.
Sengupta, supra note 77. However, M.P. Joseph, ILO's coordinator for India,
warns that monetary incentives are not the best avenue to reform. He stresses
that child labor is not driven by poverty alone, but by habit as well, and that
societal attitudes must also be changed to make an impact. Id.
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countries must encourage developing nations to build new
facilities and require school attendance through a minimum age.
Additionally, the agreement must alleviate the poverty that forces
some children to work to support their families. Although an
imposing task, the reduction of poverty is an essential step in the
elimination of child labor in other countries.
The final step follows the removal of the underlying causes of
child labor. Once those causes no longer exist, the agreement
should require the abolishment of the remaining forms of child
labor. This action should be easier once the underlying causes of
child labor have been removed, because there would be little need
for children to work. With the causes of child labor effectively
eliminated, there would be no impediment to the complete
abolishment of all forms of child labor. Developing countries
would no longer need child labor to gain a competitive advantage,
because all countries would be competing on a more level playing
field. Any country that continues to resist should be penalized
heavily under the GATT provisions.
Once negotiations on the agreement have been completed,
use of the WTO may aid in quicker passage of the measures.
Although the general rule remains that the WTO will make
decisions by consensus,2 7 2 in cases in which a decision cannot be
reached by consensus, the issue will be decided by a vote. 2 73 In
these situations, each country has one vote,2 74 and the majority
wins.2 75 Further, in cases of amendments to the agreements
making up the new GATT, a three-fourths majority may decide
that the amendment is of such a nature that any member that
does not accept it is free to withdraw from the WTO. 2 76 Thus, a
country could present the proposed agreement as an amendment
to the TBT Agreement, and passage would bind even those parties
that opposed the amendment.
At least in theory, then, the WTO agreement allows for the
binding of states to agreements without their consent.2 77 Since
this conflicts with established international law, 278 it may not

272. WTO, supranote 200, art. IX(l).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. When the WTO, in its role as the Dispute Settlement Body, makes
a decision, that decision is by consensus, not by vote. USD, supranote 208, art.
2(4).
276. WTO, supra note 200, art. X(3). The Act excepts certain agreements
from this possibility. Id art. X(2).
277. Of course, although countries may automatically become parties to the
agreement, they will not see it as binding on them until they ratify it themselves,
an action not within the province of the WTO.
278. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supranote 52, art. 34 (rAtreaty does not
create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.").
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work in actual practice. It would be more effective and lead to
more certainty if the agreement were negotiated in such a way
that all parties could give their approval before being bound. In
other words, the new agreement would take the form of a treaty
open to all countries to sign, and only by signing the agreement
would a country be bound by its terms.
Further, because not all nations are party to the new GATT,
prohibitions against child labor must quickly be established as
customary international law binding on all nations. This goal
may be accomplished by applying the theory of contemporary
2 79
international lawmaking called universal international law.
Under this theory, multilateral fora2 8 0 serve as a substitute for
the state practice and opinio juris normally required to create
customary international law.2 8 1 At such a forum, during the
discussion of important issues of global concern, a rule may
emerge as a way to address the problem. If this rule receives

sufficient support at the forum,2 8 2 the rule is presented to the
larger international community. If received positively,228834 the rule
enters into the greater body of public international law.
While this theory of lawmaking has its critics, 28 5 it has been
borne out in several recent examples. 28 6 Nothing can be lost by
attempting to accelerate a prohibition against child labor into
public international law. The most public forum in which to
The
propose such a rule would be the United Nations.
unanimous adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
by the General Assembly reveals a willingness to make efforts to
end abuses against children. Thus, a rule against child labor
would likely receive great support at this forum and, shortly
thereafter, enter into public international law.
If these efforts prove unsuccessful, the failure will simply
Once the
delay the eventual adoption of a customary rule.
multilateral agreement negotiated by the WTO enters into its final

279.

Charney, supranote 51.

Such fora include the U.N. General Assembly, regional organizations,
organizations. Id. at 543-44.
281. Id. at 543.
282. A consensus of the parties present may suffice to meet this
requirement. Id. at 544.
283. Even tacit approval may be sufficient. Id. at 547.
280.

and other specialized international

284.
285.

Ic
See, e.g., Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International

Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 438 (1983)(arguing that such a theory destroys the
safeguards of customary lawmaking).
286.
See Charney, supranote 51, at 548-49 (listing examples in the fields of
the law of the sea, the environment, human rights, and the law of treaties). See
also Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1994) (discussing
how lawmaking by the U.N. has contributed to public international law).
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stages, state practice will support a rule against child labor.
Likewise, there would be solid support for the opiniojuriselement.
Thus, child labor prohibitions would eventually enter into public
international law.28 7 Once this occurs, countries that still have
not signed the multilateral agreement will nevertheless be bound
by international law. Thus, violations of this law can result in
heavy sanctions by the international community, bringing these
straggling countries into conformity with the rest of the
international community. The international community will then
have achieved the admirable goal of ending child labor.

V. CONCLUSION
If the United States is to succeed in ending child labor in
foreign countries, it must cease its disturbing reliance on
unilateral trade measures. Not only do such measures affect only
one strain of child labor, but they also draw cries of protectionism
from developing countries and can lead to strained trade
relations. Trade measures may be more palatable if imposed on
the multilateral level, but these are likewise ineffective in dealing
with the underlying causes of child labor.
Additionally, the United States cannot expect that signing the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child will solve the problem.
Although a multilateral measure such as this is a better solution
than unilateral trade measures, its lack of effective enforcement
provisions likely means that it would be no more successful in
solving the problem.
What is needed, then, is a multilateral measure with teeth,
one that sets standards and has an enforcement regime to back
up its requirements. This Note proposes only one such measure.
Until concerned parties develop other measures, millions of
members of the world's future generations will continue to toil
away under dangerous conditions, working for countless hours
and receiving minimal benefits for their energy.
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